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Introduction
The year 2006 marked the start of preparations leading to university reform in 
Finland. The national discussion on university reform was held concurrently 
with the higher education (HE) modernisation discourse in the Council of 
the European Union (EU). There is existing research on the development of 
EU-level cooperation and the development of Finnish HE policy, but relatively 
little research on the significance of EU HE policy cooperation in member 
states. The research problem, then, is the connection between EU and national-
level discussions on HE policy. 
The research presented in this chapter evaluated the connection between 
national higher education policy formation and EU-level discussion on 
higher education. Policy transfer theory has been tested by Moisio (2014) as 
an explanatory model for studying the success or failure of EU cooperation 
in HE policy. The policy transfer method pays particular attention to the 
policy formation process and the possibility of transfer of ideas, policies and 
arrangements from one political setting to another setting or system (Radaelli 
2000; Dolowitz & Marsh 2000). 
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Policy learning and policy transfer 
There is some evidence that the EU education policy discourse has been 
transferred to EU member states. Lange and Alexiadou’s (2010) research 
differentiates various policy learning styles (mutual learning, competitive 
policy learning, imperialistic policy learning and surface policy learning) in 
education policy by categorising different types of interactions between the 
same range of public policy actors (member states themselves and member 
states and the European Commission). The concept of mutual learning 
holds that qualitative knowledge about different practices is as important as 
quantitative information. Participation in mutual learning is voluntary, and 
participating countries/member states have positive incentives to participate 
(in clusters and peer learning activities) when the knowledge from these events 
may help them solve national policy problems. 
According to Lange and Alexiadou, the concept of competitive policy 
learning focuses more on the quantitative side of cooperation. Various EU 
institutions (Eurostat, Cedefop and the European Training Foundation) 
develop statistical analyses of education practices in the EU. Competitive 
learning starts from specific assumptions, indicators or benchmarks, and 
discussions are limited to the selected problems. While mutual learning is aimed 
at the deep learning of traditions and politics, the goal of competitive learning 
is to open up international comparisons. Competitive learning depends on the 
pressure created on member states. Because states are motivated to preserve 
their good reputation, pressure becomes effective when combined with media 
attention. Since statistics are created mainly by formal institutions, competitive 
learning is less of a bottom-up process than mutual learning (pp. 452–454). 
Lawn and Lingard’s (2002, 300) earlier study also stresses the importance of 
statistical production—previously done mainly by the OECD but latterly by 
the EU as well—and the statistical comparison that is central to harmonisation. 
However, Erkkilä (2014) argues that the European Commission has increased 
its role in HE policy by using global university rankings. These rankings have 
created “a political imaginary competition, where European universities must 
be reformed if they are to be successful” (p. 92).
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The concept of imperialistic policy learning refers to the attempt by 
some countries to export their national education policies to others as well 
as to the European Commission’s policy agenda (Lange & Alexiadou 2010, 
452–454). There is some evidence that this has been one of the goals of the 
United Kingdom’s HE policy (Alexiadou & Lange 2011). Conversely, surface 
policy learning refers to a more passive or negative response by a member state, 
which is an attempt to minimise the influence of the Commission or other 
member states. Learning, for the most part, entails only observation of possible 
infringements of national sovereignty that should be reported back to national 
administrations. Another manifestation of surface policy learning, according 
to Lange and Alexiadou (2010, 455–456), is the national progress reporting for 
Education and Training 2010/2020, which sometimes only describes member 
states’ own national education policies, even with regard to benchmarks that 
differ in scope or timeline from those mutually agreed at the EU level.  
As members of international structures or regimes, national governments 
may have to adopt policies as part of their obligations. The question here is 
whether policy transfer within the EU can be interpreted as coercive, given 
that individual nations have, in principle, joined the EU voluntarily. Dolowitz 
and Marsh (2000, 14–15) point out that each member state does have influence 
over the adoption of EU policies; thus, they actively and voluntarily shape EU 
politics. It is therefore possible to argue that policy transfer in the EU is both 
obligated and negotiated. 
Contemporary policies are increasingly affected by policy transfer, 
especially in the European context, because of close cooperation between many 
policy fields. As part of globalisation and Europeanisation, politicians and 
civil servants have become acquainted with each other, and at the same time, 
international organisations and policy entrepreneurs “sell” policies around the 
world. Teichler (2004) wisely reminds us, however, that although the increase 
of knowledge transfer across nations has typically been seen as a phenomenon 
of globalisation, one must keep in mind that governments are highly active in 
shaping the rules of knowledge transfer, doing so in order to maximise their 
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national gains (p. 13). The penultimate section of this chapter examines the 
concept of policy transfer in greater depth. 
Policy transfer and explaining lesson drawing
Radaelli (2000) and Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) define policy transfer as a 
process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in one political setting or system (past or present) is 
used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions 
and ideas in another political setting or system. Dale (1999) identifies a total 
of eight mechanisms under policy transfer: borrowing, learning, teaching, 
harmonisation, dissemination, standardisation, installing interdependence 
and imposition. Policy transfer is the comprehensive term for all these 
mechanisms, covering both voluntary and coercive transfer in different 
circumstances and by various actors.
The concepts of policy transfer and policy diffusion are both founded 
on the notion that the ideas of other countries or systems may be worth 
testing elsewhere. These policies may either spread or be transferred to new 
environments. The difference between policy transfer and policy diffusion is 
that diffusion studies tend not to reveal anything about the content of new 
policies, focusing more on process than on substance (Dolowitz & Marsh 
1996, 345).
In the globalised world of the twenty-first century, policy transfer is a policy 
formation tool that has gradually increased in use between nations.1 Public 
policy is something that is both global and national, and policy-makers study 
other political systems for new ideas about policies, programmes, institutions 
and jurisdictions, which they look to apply to their own context. The policy 
transfer concept can be used either as an independent variable—to explain 
1 Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) mention three reasons for increasing policy transfer: global 
economic pressure, rapid growth of communications and the influence of international 
organisations. 
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why a particular policy was adopted—or as a dependent variable, to explain 
why transfer occurs (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 354).
The following questions can usefully be asked about policy transfer. Why 
engage in policy transfer? Who transfers policy? What is transferred? From 
where and why? How is the transfer composed, and what are the different 
degrees of transfer? How is the process related to policy success or failure 
(see Radaelli 2000; Dolowitz & Marsh 2000)? It has been shown that at least 
six main categories of actors are involved in policy transfer: elected officials, 
political parties, civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs/experts 
and supranational institutions (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 345). 
Policy transfer may be either voluntary or coercive and includes objects such 
as policy goals, structure and content, instruments and techniques, institutions, 
ideology, attitudes and concepts as well as negative lessons (Dolowitz & Marsh 
1996, 350). Voluntary transfer is usually based on a perceived dissatisfaction 
with a current state or even on observed policy failure. Uncertainty about the 
reasons behind problems or the effects of previous decisions may prompt actors 
to search for policies they might wish to borrow. As Haas (quoted in Dolowitz 
& Marsh 1996, 347) put it: “International collaboration…is an attempt to 
reduce uncertainty”. 
Coercive transfer can take place either directly or indirectly. Direct coercive 
transfer occurs when transfer is required by an external actor. However, that 
obligation is rarely imposed by another state; international institutions are 
typical players in direct coercive actions, and EU legislation is a good example 
of this kind of measure. Indirect coercive methods derive from a variety of 
situations, including technological development, economic pressures and 
international consensus. Fears of being left behind on an important public 
issue may also generate attention and lead to policy transfer: “A country can 
indirectly be pushed towards policy transfer if political actors perceive their 
country falling behind its neighbours or competitors” (Dolowitz & Marsh 
1996, 347–349). This can be driven by international comparisons, which are 
made against the current best. The international flow of national data has 
increased, and comparison is now an everyday business, usually conducted 
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between countries. It has been argued that comparison is a highly visible tool 
for governing at all levels: at the organisational level for management purposes 
and at the state level for governing and measuring performance (e.g. PISA) 
(Grek, Lawn, Lingard, Ozga, Rinne, Segerholm & Simola 2009, 10).
Another question concerns why countries engage in policy transfer. Both 
supporters and opponents of various policies use reasoning, as needed, to win 
support for their ideas. It has been noted that policy lessons from abroad can 
also be used as neutral truths, but equally, these truths can also be used as 
political weapons (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 346). Dale observes that policy 
borrowing, in particular, is often related to policy legitimation and political 
usefulness since borrowing is voluntary and is conducted between more or less 
compatible systems: “We don’t usually borrow something we don’t know we 
have a use, even a need for…” (Dale 1999, 9). 
The factors that may constrain policy transfer are multiple, and the viability 
of the transferred subject will be judged at a national level according to existing 
norms and expectations (p. 9). The more complex the policy or programme, 
the more difficult it is to transfer, and differences or similarities between host 
and target countries or systems also matter. However, the simpler the expected 
outcomes are to predict, the easier the transfer becomes. Bureaucratic size 
and efficiency may also influence transfer, as well as economic resources, since 
implementation often requires financial measures (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 
354). 
Policy learning can be understood as one of the tools of policy transfer,2 
which entails learning about organisations, programmes or policies. The 
definition of the term is quite broad and may mean that some form of learning 
is likely to be present in any mechanism of policy transfer. According to 
Dale (1999, 10–11), normal policy-making is associated with learning about 
instruments, while learning about policy goals arises in relation to reforms or 
shifts in policy paradigms.
2 According to Hill (1997), policy transfer theory builds on Rose’s (1991; 1993) work on 
policy learning.
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Policy transfer through harmonisation is commonplace in some areas 
of European integration. The harmonisation mechanism works through 
collective agreement, whereby all member states pool some of their sovereignty 
for the benefit of the EU. Dissemination differs from harmonisation in its 
dimension and extent: the OECD is a good example of an international 
actor that disseminates ideas to participant countries that do not have the 
competency to harmonise policies. Installing interdependence is a policy 
transfer mechanism that usually concerns issues that go beyond the scope of 
any nation state (peace, environment or human rights). It is focused purely on 
policy goals and usually works in a bottom-up manner, including the whole of 
civil society. Finally, imposition is coercive and is the only mechanism that does 
not require learning, persuasion or cooperation (Dale 1999, 9–15).  
Bulmer and Padgett (2004) use another typology to define different types 
of policy transfer. Emulation or copying is the strongest form of transfer, 
involving the borrowing of a policy model, in its entirety, from another 
jurisdiction. Conversely, synthesis includes elements of a policy from several 
sources. Influence is a weak form of transfer, which only inspires a new policy. 
Finally, an abortive measure occurs when transfer is hindered by the borrower 
(p. 106). 
In order to understand policy transfer, it is necessary to recognise several 
other factors. It is not enough to treat transfer as if it were an “all-or-nothing” 
process: the motivations involved must also be taken into consideration. The 
policies may develop over time, especially when borrowing policies from 
elsewhere. Second, different actors may have different motivations. It is 
likely that politicians and policy entrepreneurs will introduce a process on a 
voluntary basis, but when international organisations become involved, this 
is likely to result in some coercive policy transfer—although, of course, this 
depends on the particular action. Finally, the timing of the transfer also affects 
the process. In times of political and economic stability, transfer is likely to 
be voluntary. However, during political crises, policy transfer is likely to have 
some coercive elements (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, 16-17). 
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The concept of policy diffusion is a little different from that of policy 
transfer. Policy diffusion is analysed to identify why some governments 
come to adopt policies brought from elsewhere and why others are more 
reluctant—why governments differ in their readiness to act. At one end of 
the scale is immunity, where no diffusion of a policy is possible because the 
organisational or state unit is not open to new external ideas; at the opposite 
end is isomorphism, meaning that diffusion of ideas and concepts occurs quite 
easily, producing homogenisation across states. In reacting to external policy 
pressure, there are three means or strategic choices: resistance, imitation and 
adaptation. Resistance is a likely initial reaction to external pressure, protecting 
already established values from external ideas. Strong resistance may make the 
state or organisation immune to new ideas and concepts. Imitation relates to 
the concept of isomorphism, whereby new ideas are adopted smoothly and 
receptively (Bache & Olsson 2001, 218). 
Adaptation may occur on a conceptual level or in practice, or even both. On 
the conceptual level, an organisation or state may adopt ideas from the external 
world as a rational strategy. However, changes at the conceptual level may also 
change practice. The discourse around new ideas in an organisation or a state 
unit may impact “like a virus that spreads and infects the behaviour” (Bache 
& Olsson 2001, 218). Adaptation may also work like a translation process, in 
which ideas and concepts may be given a local perspective (see Bache & Olsson 
2001, 218; Karakhanyan, van Veen & Bergen 2011, 23–24). While policy 
diffusion emphasises structures, the concept of policy transfer stresses policy 
content and the role of agency in transferring ideas and practices; thus, the 
concepts are interactive (Karakhanyan et al. 2011, 58).
Policy transfer in the EU
Radaelli (2000) attempts to understand policy change within the EU by 
utilising the concept of policy transfer. He observes that the EU is in fact an 
enormous platform of different policy transfers from dominant countries and/
or from advocacy coalitions to other countries and coalitions. The European 
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Commission can be seen as an active policy entrepreneur in this process, 
acting in concert with other “policy transfer activists” such as pressure groups 
or policy experts. Policy transfer implies that “policy diffusion is a rational 
process wherein imitation, copying and adaptation are the consequences of 
rational decisions by policy-makers” (Radaelli 2000, 26, 38).
Radaelli (2000, 31–32) describes the legitimation of the European 
Monetary Union by a transfer process that included several central elements: 
history and learning, bargaining, the anchoring power of the Deutschmark 
and consensus on the paradigm of policy credibility. Policy transfer can occur 
both as dependent and independent variables. One can explain policy transfer 
as a process or use policy transfer to explain policy outcomes (Dolowitz & 
Marsh 2000, 8). Radaelli (2003, 12) argues that policy learning within the EU 
context is mostly about power. The formation of indicators, peer reviews and 
common guidelines supports this view as they produce hierarchies of various 
responses to political problems and create different pressures on member states 
to adapt. 
According to Bulmer and Padgett (2004), there has been little consensus on 
how policy transfer really works in the EU. Their argument is that because there 
are varied governance structures within the EU, they generate various transfer 
types. This, in particular, explains why the EU is such a good “laboratory” for 
testing the policy transfer concept. The authors identify three different forms 
of governance in EU politics, which will be introduced next and summarised 
in Table 1 (see also Bulmer et al. 2007). 
Hierarchical governance operates in policies related directly to the single 
market, where the EU may exercise supranational power granted by the treaties 
and utilise coercive measures of policy transfer. These measures are based on 
supranational European law, but they are also based on the powers delegated 
to supranational institutions, such as the Commission’s powers in relation 
to competition policy. A state must adopt such a policy as a member of an 
international organisation or as a condition of financial assistance from it. This 
form of governance involves a high level of institutionalisation. Hierarchical 
transfer is related to “negative” integration, which is the purest form of this 
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type of governance; the abolition of restrictive measures from the single market 
is an example of negative integration. A softer form of hierarchical governance 
comes from secondary legislation (Bulmer & Padgett 2004, 104–105, 108). For 
instance, a directive for professional qualifications was negotiated and adopted 
in the Council and the European Parliament and then transferred to member 
states. Member states are key players in this transfer process because they must 
implement this legally binding directive. The Commission and the European 
Court of Justice supervise this implementation and ensure that the policy’s 
content is transferred, as decided at the EU level, and that the member state 
has really “learned” from the EU policy. Bulmer and Padgett argue that the use 
of coercive measures and high institutional density in hierarchical governance 
obliges member states to emulate EU models (p. 109).
A second form of governance is based on the common rules and norms 
agreed by member states and adopted by the EU, using the qualified majority 
vote (QMV). This form of governance is negotiated and is fairly common 
within the EU. Negotiation takes place in a variety of EU contexts, and 
agreements range from binding legal rules to informal understandings. 
According to Bulmer and Padgett, this form of governance has been referred 
to as a “negotiated order”, often occurring in circumstances where policy 
models or ideas from one or more member states are incorporated into EU 
norms (104–106). Negotiation is characterised by bargaining and problem-
solving. Bargaining is likely to produce competition between negotiators, and 
transfer outcomes are likely to correspond to the weaker forms of synthesis or 
influence, with the possibility of abortive transfer. Conversely, problem-solving 
may succeed in shaping negotiators’ preferences, since it promotes information 
exchange amongst participants. By providing incentives to national actors, 
this opens them up to new policy models from other member states and creates 
the circumstances for emulative policy transfer. For this reason, Bulmer 
and Padgett argue that bargained negotiation under unanimity hinders the 
transfer process, as the outcomes are weaker than those received by problem-
solving under QMV (p. 110).  
77
Policy transfer in higher education policy formation
Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives on
Higher Education Management and Transformation
A third model is based on voluntary cooperation and exchange in policy 
areas where member states retain sovereignty but coordinate policy through 
EU institutions. In fact, the interaction between national policy-makers is 
facilitated by the EU. Bulmer and Padgett call this form of transfer “facilitated 
unilateralism”. Voluntary transfer takes place when a sovereign state 
unilaterally adopts policy from an external source. In this form of governance, 
transfer occurs horizontally through the diffusion of policies between 
member states. Facilitated unilateralism only employs soft or flexible rules and 
influence to persuade member states to redefine their policies. With a low level 
of institutionalisation, EU institutions act as enablers of cooperation, and non-
governmental actors are largely absent. An example of facilitated unilateralism 
is the open method of coordination (OMC), which applies guidelines and 
benchmarks to influence decision-making in member states (104–106, 110). 
In defining the different types of EU policy transfer, Bulmer and Padgett 
use the above-mentioned typology of emulation, synthesis, influence and 
abortive measures. They argue that hierarchical governance will generate the 
strongest form of policy transfer—that is, emulation and synthesis—citing 
the example of the European Monetary Union in making the interesting 
point that, within the EU, negotiation may produce emulation. Usually, 
however, member states’ attempts to shape EU policies result in synthesis or 
mere influence. According to Bulmer and Padgett, facilitated unilateralism 
is confined to mutual influence between member states, or even to abortive 
transfer (p. 106). Table 1 provides examples of the institutional variables linked 
to possible transfer outcomes.
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Table 1. Mode of governance, institutional variable and transfer outcomes
(adapted from Bulmer & Padgett 2004, 107)
Mode of 
Governance
Institutional variables Range of likely 
transfer outcomes
Hierarchy Authority/normative mandate accruing to EU 
institutions
Density of rules
Availability of sanctions/incentives
Emulation-Synthesis
Negotiation Decision rules/Mode of negotiation:
QMV + problem solving
Unanimity + bargaining
Emulation-Synthesis
Synthesis-Abortive
Facilitation Institutionalization:
Treaty incorporation of objectives
Specificity of guidelines
Quantifiable benchmarks
Density of exchange networks
Influence-Abortive
Alternatives to policy transfer
Criticisms of policy transfer focus mainly on its importance—is it really a 
theory or just another form of policy-making, distinct from more conventional 
forms? There have also been questions regarding why lesson-drawing and policy 
transfer occur in place of other forms of policy-making. A third question that 
arises is how the policy transfer method affects policy-making, particularly 
when compared to other policy processes (James & Lodge 2003).
James and Lodge (2003) argue that “lesson-drawing” and “policy transfer” 
are difficult to distinguish from other forms of policy-making. They maintain 
that researchers interested in conceptual, non-domestic or across-time 
influences in policy-making should not restrict themselves to the policy 
transfer framework, as there are other available approaches. The authors give 
two examples, the first of which is the institutional approach, explaining how 
policy-making is mediated by institutions. Institutionalism offers an answer 
to the question of who has power in coercive action, and why some actors are 
recipients, and some are not. Institutional analysis also offers an explanation of 
how organisational structures affect learning processes. A second alternative 
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or supplementary explanatory model to policy transfer, according to James 
and Lodge, is the power of ideas in policy-making. The spread of ideas 
often includes networks of actors involved in learning and transfer, and the 
nature of the network—whether it is an advocacy coalition or an epistemic 
community—is important. 
James and Lodge argue that developing clearer measures of “transfer” might 
help to develop the approach. Effort should also be made to validate whether 
transfer has occurred and to assess, as needed, the extent of non-transfer. One 
must note that James and Lodge’s criticism is from 2003 when the OMC had 
just started as a policy learning format within the EU. The authors refer to 
the process of Europeanisation and the OMC, but it was for the purpose of 
estimating its effects.
Policy transfer can be a useful explanatory tool, but other explanatory 
models can also be useful, such as international cooperation, policy networks, 
advocacy coalitions and epistemic communities, which also develop and 
promote various policies and ideas (also Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, 21; Radaelli 
1999) and present another way to study the phenomenon at hand. According 
to Enders (2004, 374), Europeanised policy responses in HE may also be an 
example of mutual adjustment. Governments continue to adopt their own 
national policies, but in so doing, they reflect the policy choices of other 
governments or perceived European developments. Bulmer et al. (2007, 5) 
add that in earlier periods of policy analysis, it was typical to look at policy 
convergence since national policy-makers tended to rely on signals from the 
international system. By adopting similar solutions, there appeared to be 
convergence. This approach, however, focuses primarily on policy outcomes 
more than on the actors and methods of the policy process. The policy transfer 
approach also identifies the external catalysts for change, key actors, reasons 
behind as well as different steps in the process whereby policy from one 
jurisdiction is shifted to another. 
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The utility of policy transfer
As described in Moisio (2014), Bulmer and Padgett’s (2004) typology of 
various forms of governance and policy transfer may serve to explain the policy 
transfer forms in EU policy cooperation in HE (see Table 2).
Bulmer and colleagues (2007, 9) note that governance by negotiation 
amounts to policy transfer by consent, centred on the Council of the EU. 
Common rules and norms are agreed by the member states and thereby 
adopted by the EU. In the process, member states have the opportunity to 
“upload” their policy preferences to the supranational level. The Commission 
is the agenda-setter, and it “controls the access points at which policy ideas 
enter the EU system” (p. 55), as member states also try to influence the ideas 
adopted by the Commission for transfer. “Self-interested Member States can 
be expected to compete to shape EU norms according to domestic preferences 
and practices, thereby reducing the subsequent adaptation pressures” (p. 20). 
In a soft law sector such as education, as noted above, adaptation pressure 
is minimal, which may in part explain why Finland was active in the HE 
modernisation talks, seeking to direct the discussion in the Council to favour 
the purposes of national policy formation.
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Table 2. Governance of education and policy transfer
(adopted from Bulmer and Padgett 2004; Bulmer et al. 2007, 25)
Mode of 
Governance
Institutional variables Range of likely 
transfer outcomes
*Instrument* in 
education policy
Negotiation Decision rules/Mode of 
negotiation:
QMV + problem solving
Unanimity + bargaining
Emulation-Synthesis
Synthesis-Abortive
Recommendation of the 
EYC
Resolution/conclusion of 
the EYC
Facilitation Institutionalization: 
Treaty incorporation of 
objectives
Specificity of guidelines
Quantifiable benchmarks
Density of exchange 
networks
Influence-Abortive ET 2010
OMC
“Under facilitation sovereignty remains vested in national arenas, but is 
overlaid by interaction between national policy-makers facilitated by the EU” 
(p. 23). Facilitation as a mode of governance offers only soft and flexible means 
to persuade member states to reassess their policy practices; the new form of 
cooperation, the OMC, was a good example of such means. The role of the EU 
is to work as an enabler of exchange and a mediator between member states (p. 
24). A low level of institutionalisation means that policy transfer is restricted 
to influence and that there is a relatively high incidence of abortive measures 
(p. 24). According to the Finnish experts interviewed for the study, this was 
the case with OMC in HE policy.
Policy transfer can be a useful explanatory tool, but it is clear that no 
theory can explain all outcomes. Other explanatory models can also be useful, 
such as international cooperation, policy networks, advocacy coalitions and 
epistemic communities, which also develop and promote various policies 
and ideas (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, 21; Radaelli 1999) and could be another 
way of studying the phenomenon at hand. According to Enders (2004, 374), 
Europeanised policy responses in HE may also be an example of mutual 
adjustment; governments continue to adopt their own national policies, but 
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in so doing, they reflect the policy choices of other governments or perceived 
European developments. It is possible to conclude, however, that policy 
transfer can be useful when explaining the outcomes of the four categories of 
description here. Moreover, the results suggest that the theoretical development 
could be further improved by introducing the concepts of interaction and/or 
policy spin. 
The outcome space below shows how the significance of EU cooperation 
arises according to the understandings of Finnish HE policy experts, from 
category D (irrelevance and resistance) to category A (change)—that is, from 
entirely voluntary cooperation (OMC) to semi-coercive negotiated transfer 
(the Lisbon Strategy implementation). The categories are different and 
separate, but their contents are mutually supportive. For instance, the notion 
of a new kind of interdependence in category A supports the understanding of 
a variety of influences on a member state from EU cooperation. Category C, 
in describing fusion, supports category A in characterising change in EU-level 
cooperation: other forms of cooperation (OECD and Bologna) were seen to 
be important, but the relevance of EU cooperation increased at the turn of the 
century. The understandings in category D of the irrelevance of the OMC and 
soft law can also be supported by category C, where the interviewees observed 
that the EU is only one form of international cooperation. Clearly, although 
they can be introduced separately, the categories are also interconnected. 
Figure 1 presents the completed outcome space for the four results 
categories. The preliminary outcome space improved with the scale of policy 
transfer (according to Bulmer et al. 2007). EU HE policy cooperation does 
not reach the point of entirely coercive transfer, moving from completely 
voluntary policy transfer to semi-coercive policy transfer when connected 
with overall EU goals, such as the Lisbon Strategy. To date, there has been 
no direct imposition of implementation of EU HE policy; thus, the outcome 
space stops at semi-coercive transfer. Here, the term “to date” is of relevance, as 
the new EU2020 strategy and its follow-up, with the European semester and 
new financial regulation, may change the situation in the near future. This may 
be a theme for further research. 
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With reference to the scale of policy transfer (from Bulmer et al. 2007, 15), EU 
HE policy cooperation has changed from voluntary to semi-coercive policy 
transfer, but it has yet to become entirely coercive.
Conclusion
Effective policy analysis requires knowledge of how policy works. If reformers 
do not understand causation in public policy, they cannot assess whether or not 
their choices will work. A failure to understand decision-making procedures 
and the context within which they work often results in inappropriate choices 
when transforming methods of policy-making (John 1998, 10).
The purpose of this chapter was to describe how, through the transferability 
and functionality of transfer mechanisms, it is possible to study the effectiveness 
of policy cooperation. Policy transfer theory may help in understanding what is 
significant in EU cooperation and which methods of EU cooperation transfer 
Figure 1. Outcome space: From voluntary to semi-coercive transfer
Entirely Coercive
(direct imposition)
Perfectly Voluntary
(lesson-drawing)
Semi-Coercive
(negotiated, perceived necessity)
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policies to the national level. In the post-2006 context of Finnish HE policy 
formation, there was a clear connection between EU-level and national-level 
decision-making. The theoretical framework offers an approach to combining 
the different findings and observations and can be used as an “overcoat” for the 
study, but theory alone cannot explain all possible results (Maxwell 1996, 33).
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